









The financial impacts of electrification 





The principle objective of this study has been to evaluate the financial impacts of 
electrification of the electricity distribution industry, incorporating new 
infonnation and examining new questions in doing so. In particular, this study 
has considered the effects of: 
• institutional changes in the distribution industry; 
• the implementation of capacity differentiated supplies (2.SA/20A/60A); 
• the reduction of electrification targets by 20%; and 
• the introduction of a capital expenditure limit (R4000 per connection). 
The analysis has measured the impacts of electrification by attempting to quantify: 
• capital requirements over a 20 year period; 
• operating losses and surpluses over the same period; 
• accumulation of debt given different levels of subsidisation; and 
• the required subsidies to ensure sustainability, and mechanisms to raise and 
distribute these subsidies. 
The institutional options considered in this analysis were: 
• the status quo: Eskom's Distribution Group and non-Eskom distributors; 
• the establishment of a National Electricity Distributor (NED); and 
• the establishment of Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs), based along 
provincial boundaries. 
The methodology used has been a financial analysis from the viewpoint of a 
specific distribution agency (for simplicity, non-Eskom distributors were grouped 
together). This analysis involved the quantification of capital and operating costs, 
revenue and finance charges. Assumptions had to be made concerning future 
tariff levels, operating costs and consumption growth (including losses). 
Connection rates were based on those used by Els (1994), broken down for each 
province in such a way that access levels are substantially improved in all regions 
of the country. Details of assumptions and connection rates are presented in 
appendix A 
Capital costs were derived fz:om a modelling exercise undertaken by Eskom 
Distribution Technologies for this study. This exercise calculated grid extension 
costs for each magisterial district based on existing and projected demographic 
patterns and existing distribution networks. Demographic data was extracted 
from the NELF demand-side database for this exercise. 
The capital cost modelling exercise has revealed the following results: 
• Average costs per connection are likely to be higher than assumed in other 
analyses and higher than the proposed capital limits. Using capacity 
differentiated supplies, average costs under the NED scenario were R 4 500 
per connection. 
• There are large regional differences: provinces with large rural populations 
require the largest capital investment. In particular, the Eastern Cape has 
exceptionally high average costs of connection and will require 25% of all 
investment 
• The use of capacity differentiated supplies in rural areas reduces the capital 
costs by some 30%, and these savings are particularly pronounced later in the 
programme as more remote settlements are reached. 
• Reducing electrification targets will reduce capital costs by slightly more than 
the percentage reduction in connections. This is due to the postponing of 
more expensive connections. 
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• Total capital requirements are in the region of R1 .5 to R2 billion per annum, 
resulting in a total capital investment of some R28 billion over the period 
1992-2011. 
Summary of key results for the status quo and NED scenarios: 1992-2011 
Eskom Non-
Eskom 
I Ave connections per annum : 200 000 110 000 
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Capital expenditure (capex) i R 19 bill R 9 bill i R 28 bill R 28 bill 
Ave capex per annum i R 930 mill R 420 mill ! R 1350 mill R 1 350 mill 
~ l Capex per connection · R 4 700 R 4 000 · R 4 500 R 4 500 
-"N~"P;~ nt va·I~;;·(-NJ:)v)-··-··+···(R-14biii)··-······--<R·6-t)~i)-·-···1-·· ·(R .. 2o .. t)iii). <R 2o .. b.ili>-
: i 
NPV per connection ! (R 3 450) (R 2 600) I (R 3 250) (R 3 250) 
The main results from the analysis of the net present value (NPV) of the 
programme are summarised below. 
• In terms of NPV, there only negligible differences between a rationalised 
industry and the status quo. 
• The NPV of the electrification programme is highly negative (-R20 billion), 
and this result is not affected by a sensitivity analysis on the key variables. 
• The use of conventional supply levels (40A/connection) decreases the NPV of 
the programme by approximately 3096. 
• The introduction of a capital limit would mean that approximately R9 billion 
would have to be provided by non-utility sources in order to meet connection 
targets, and this would increase the NPV by 2296. 
• Lower targets (a 2096 reduction) have the effect of increasing the NPV by 2896. 
Most of this increase is made up of reduced capital costs. 
Operating losses (excl. finance charges): 1992-2011 
Province Ave monthly Present value Portion 
surplus/(loss) per of surplus/(loss) of total loss 
customer 1995 R mill % 
Eastern Cape (R5.93) (R289) 27% 
Northern Province (R 6.28) (R177) 17% 
KwaZulu/Natal (R2.83) (R121) 12% 
Free State (R5.99) (R119) 12% 
Mpumalanga (R5.52) (R108) 11% 
North West (R4.70) (R98) 10% 
Western Cape (R3.86) (R78) 8% 
Northern Cape (R4.69) (R27) 2% 
Gauteng (R1.21) (R12) 1% 
Total (R4.01) (R1 029) 100% 
Note: If the time period 1996-2011 is taken, the losses decrease and, in the case of Gauteng, turns D 
a surplus. This is because revenues improve later in the programme. 
It was clear that electrification would make substantial operating losses (even 
before the effects of finance charges are considered). Under the NED scenario, 
operating losses turn to surpluses towards the end of the programme, but this is 
insufficient to meet the losses accumulated during the early years. Provinces with 
the high rural populations experience the highest losses. 
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Cumulative debt for different levels of subsidisation 
Cross subsidy Eskom Non- Eskom + NED 
[A/customer/month) Eskom Non-Eskom 
No cross-subsidy R 38 bill R 17 bill R 55 bill R 55 bill 
R10 R 30 bill R 13 bill R 43 bill R 43 bill 
R30 R 13 bill R 5 bill R 18 bill R 18 bill 
R50 R 0.2 bill no debt R 0.2 bill no debt 
In analysing debt levels and required subsidies, the analysis arrived at the 
following results: 
• The electrification programme requires extensive subsidisation to be 
financially viable. 
• These subsidies are in the range of Rl billion to R1.2 billion per annum, 
equivalent to approximately 70% of capital costs. 
• There are sufficient surpluses within the electricity distribution industry to 
provide these subsidies, if they are available for this purpose. 
• If surpluses are not available, a general price increase of 0.39c/kWh (a 4% 
increase) would be required to ensure the financial sustainability of the 
programme. If the price increase was applied only to domestic customers, the 
price increase would have to be in the order of 2.6c/kWh (a 16% increase). 
Alternatively, Government would have to contribute approximately 70% of 
capital costs. 
• Under a system of REDs, financial transfers could be effected either through 
an electrification fund or a system of bulk supply discounts and surcharges. 
Subsidies required for electrification: 1995-2011 
as an annual as a% as a general as a domestic 
transfer of surplus price increase' price increase' 
[c/kWh], [(%)] [c/kWh], [%) 
Eskom R875mill 105% 0.54 (4%) n/a 
Non-Eskom R400mill 15% 0.33 (3%) n/a 
NED R1 200 mill 40% 0.39 (4%) 2.6 (16%) 
If a distribution utility (or utilities) is to be created, separate from Eskom's 
Generation and Transmission Groups, and if much of the existing surplus 
associated with electricity distribution continues to be earmarked for local 
governments, it is clear that such a utility will be in a precarious financial position. 
Under these circumstances, careful consideration will have to be given to the 
following: 
• mechanisms to raise sufficient capital at low cost, with the assurance that 
loans and finance charges will be met; 
• mechanisms to transfer subsidies (or utilise cross-subsidies) in order to ensure 
financial sustainability of distribution; 
• adequate regulation of bulk supply tariffs to ensure that the surpluses 
associated with electricity supply are equitably allocated between a generation 
and transmission utility on the one hand, and a distribution utility (or 
utilities) on the other. 
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The underlying objective of this study is to explore the financial consequences, for 
the electrification programme, of changes in the structure of the electricity 
distribution industry. In particular, the analysis has attempted to quantify the 
effects of: 
• rationalising tlte distribution industry, either into a national electricity 
distributor (NED) or regional electricity distributors (REDs); 
• introducing capacity differentiated supplies, with associated tariffs; 
• introducing a capital expenditure limit for electrification projects; and 
• reducing electrification targets. 
This analysis has clear implications for electrification planning: not only are the 
consequences of institutional structures relevant to planning, but the utilisation of 
capacity differentiated supplies and capital expenditure limits are of direct 
significance. 
In addition, the study has looked at options to ensure the financial sustainability 
of electrification, in particular examining the option of cross-subsidies from other 
constuners, government contributions towards capital expenditure, and options to 
facilitate financial transfers between distributors. 
This report will firstly review previous analyses of the financial impact of 
electrification, focusing on three studies by van Horen (1994), the National 
Economics of Electrification Study (NEES, 1993) and Els (1994). Thereafter the 
design and methodology used in this analysis will be presented, followed by a 
description of the rates of electrification assumed in the study, and resulting levels 
of access. The results will be presented in three sections: firstly looking at the 
capital requirements for electrification; secondly analysing the net present value of 
the electrification programme, and lastly investigating the subsidy options 
available. 
2. Review of previous work 
There have been three published studies investigating the financial impact of the 
electrification programme: 
• NEES (1993), which investigated three electrification scenarios (low, medium 
and high rates of connection) - the medium scenario is discussed here; 
• Van Horen (1994), who investigated a 'business-as-usual' scenario and an 
'Integrated Energy Planning' (IEP) scenario. The latter scenario assumed that 
electricity distnbution would be rationalised in some form and is discussed 
here; and 
• Els (1994), who looked at the electrification programme proposed by the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and distinguished 
between Eskom and non-Eskom distributors. 
In terms of connection rates, van Horen's IEP scenario, the NEES medium 
scenario and Els' scenario are all roughly similar - a peak of 450 000 to 500 0000 
connections per year. 
Capital requirements 
All three studies reach broadly similar conclusions regarding the capital 
investment requirement of the programme. The NEES study looked at the years 
1993 to 2010 and concluded that capital expenditure would be in the order of R28 
billion (1993 terms). Van Horen calculated that the total capital requirement over 
the slightly shorter period 1994 to 2010 would be in the order of R22 billion (1993 
terms). The difference is partly due to a shorter time period, but also because the 
NEES analysis had a higher average cost per connection, and included high 
expenditure on unelectrified rural farms. Els looked at the longest period, 1992 to 
EDRC 
2012, and arrived at a total capital requirement of R23.2 billion, in 1994 terms. 
These totals correspond to an annual capital requirement of R1.2 to R1.5 billion 
(Van Horen 1995), of which approximately 7596 will be spent by Eskom. 
Table 1 presents the essential assumptions and results from the three studies. 
Although connection rates, support costs, losses, and consumption rates are 
roughly similar, there are important differences regarding electricity supply costs, 
refurbishment and tariffs. Els assumed a higher bulk supply cost than the other 
two studies and also assumed real tariff decreases (1396 over four years) as 
contained in Eskom' s price compact. 
Finance charges 
An important methodological difference concerns the inclusion of finance charges 
in calculating annual costs: Els included these charges whereas the other studies 
excluded them. 
In calculating the NPV of the programme, finance charges are irrelevant since the 
discount rate reflects the cost of capital. However, when calculating the annual 
cash flow, their inclusion depends on the source of financing. If loan financing is 
used, then there will be annual interest charges which should be included. If 
cross-subsidies are used, then it may be argued that no return is expected and so 
finance charges are not applicable. Alternatively, if 'cross-subsidies' are regarded 
as a form of self-financing (or equity investment), it is reasonable for the utility to 
expect a return and so hypothetical finance charges may be included.1 Van Horen 
justifies their exclusion by defining the financing requirement as net of finance 
charges and implies that additional costs will be incurred in raising these funds, 
depending on the financing source. 
In quantifying the financial impact of electrification on a utility, as opposed to the 
capital or financing requirement, finance charges should be included with realistic 
assumptions made about the cost of these funds. In Eskom's case, capital for 
electrification has largely been raised from financial markets (through 
Electrification Participation Notes - EPNs) with cross-subsidies used to cover 
operating losses. In future it is likely that there will have to be greater reliance on 
cross-subsidies in order to contain debt levels and reduce finance charges. 
Average and marginal costs 
Els points out that a distinction should be made_ between average (or embedded) 
costs and marginal (or incremental) costs. If the costs of electrification are to be 
based on average costs, then this implies that new consumers are expected to pay 
for a pro-rata portion of previously installed infrastructure. If costs are based on 
marginal costs, then the analysis includes only the additional costs which new 
customers impose. Although (long-run) marginal costs are usually higher than 
average costs, in Eskom' s case where there has been an over-investment in 
generation capacity, the opposite is the case, at least until excess capacity has been 
taken up. Els opted to use average costs in the calculations, although the other 
two studies did not make their approach explicit. Els argues that the use of 
average costs ensures that all customers share the burden of past investments in 
an equitable manner. However, the use of 16c/kWh as the bulk supply cost 
appears excessively high given that in 1994 the bulk supply price was 10.2c/kWh. 
An economic rather than a financial analysis would always use marginal rather 
than average costs since past investments are 'sunk costs' and should not 
influence the decision to invest in new projects. However, in the financial analysis 
of an electricity distributor, the tariff charged by the bulk supplier would usually 
be sufficient to both cover past costs and meet costs associated with future 
investments (thereby ensuring financial viability and providing appropriate price 
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In an economic as opposed to a financial analysis, there is always an opportunity 
cost associated with any capital requirements (whatever its source) and this is 
reflected in the discount rate. 
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signals). In practice this means setting tariffs at the higher of marginal and 
average costs and so in the (unusual) Eskom case where marginal costs are low, 
the appropriate bulk supply tariff should be based on average costs. 
Historic and current costs 
A distinction should also be made between historic and current costs. This affects 
pricing policy in that tariffs are calculated to recover current investment costs, 
that is, they are calculated to escalate with inflation so that when new investments 
in refurbishment and replacement have to be made, there is no sudden jump in 
tariffs. However, if all figures are expressed in real prices, this consideration 
should not affect the result of any analysis. Of course there may be real price 
changes as a result of technology changes, exchange rate movements, changes in 
labour costs or productivity. If there are any justifiable grounds for suspecting 
any such changes they should be included in the calculations. 
TABLE 1: Essential assumptions and results of three financial analyses 
NEES Van Horen 
Base year 1993 1993 
Cost per connection' R4000 R3500 
Bulk supply cost 9.5c/kWh 11.2c/kWh 
Support cost R 15-R20/mth R20/mth 
Refurbishment included in bulk 2% of capex 
supply cost per annum 
Consumptions 150 - 450 kWh/mth 150-450 kWh 
Tariffs 18c/kWh 20c/kWh 
Losses 20% 12% 
Real discount rate 4% 3% 
Capital investment R28 bill R22bill 
Financing requirement R28 bill R22.4 bill 
Financing req. after 4% levy n/a R9.2 bill 
Cumulative cash flow• n/a n/a 
Cum. cash flow after 5% levy n/a n/a 
Net Present Value - R19.4 bill - R18 bill' 
1 This varies for housetype, region and time. Averages are presented. 
2 Declining by 6% real in year 1, 6% in year 2, and 1% in years 3 and 4. 
3 Consumption is different for each consumer category and varies with time. 
4 This includes finance charges assuming 100% debt finance. 







20% at yr 10; 
plus 50% at yr 20 







- R70 bill 
- R3.4 bill 
-R11.7bill 
One conclusion of the NEES analysis and van Horen's study is that operating 
losses are small in comparison to capital costs, and that operating losses turn into 
surpluses after approximately 10 years (if the urban and rural components are 
combined- rural electricity supply never generates a surplus). The NEES analysis 
concluded that the financing requirement after 20 years would be R28 billion. Van 
Horen arrived at a similar result, concluding that the financing requirement 
would be R22.4 billion (the difference being almost completely accounted for by 
differences in capital cost assumptions). However, Els arrives at a different result 
- the cumulative cash flow would be negative R70 billion - two to three times 
greater than that estimated by van Horen and NEES. The principal reason for this 
difference is that Els calculated a different quantity from the other studies: Els 
calculated the cumulative cash flow (which includes finance charges assuming 
that all financing requirements are met by debt) and the other studies arrived at 
the financing requirement excluding finance charges. Although this latter 
quantity may strictly be the amount that must be financed as a result of the 
programme, the former quantity better expresses the impact on the utility (if it is 
true that all financing sources, including any cross-subsidies, require a return). 
Van Horen (1995) has estimated that cumulative operating losses to date have 
amounted to more than R300 million. If this amount is spread over all new 
customers over the past three years, the loss per customer per month is close to 
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I Theron's (1995) estimate of R20 per month for each newly electrified customer. If 
finance charges are included (assuming that all losses and capital expenditures are 
covered by debt), the loss increases to R60 per customer per month (Theron 
1995).2 Clearly, finance charges have the effect of dramatically increasing the 
operating loss and it is this which accounts for most of the difference in results 
between Els and the other two studies. 
It should be noted that the negative cash-flows experienced in the electrification 
programme are not all financed by debt. Cross-subsidies from other customers 
are also used. Els looked at the effect of using cross-subsidies to cover annual 
operating losses and found that these were equivalent to a levy of approximately 
596 of other electriCity sales. These cross-subsidies dramatically reduced financing 
requirements over 20 years from R70 billion to R3.4 billion. Van Horen looked at 
the impact of a 496 levy on electricity generation and found that this reduced the 
peak cumulative financing requirement to R9.2 billion. 
Els' study arrived at a lower net present value than the other two studies, despite 
having a higher discount rate. In fact, the cause of this difference (when 
comparing Els with NEES) is that Els estimated lower capital costs. Given this 
difference it is van Horen's result which appears relatively high and there is no 
obvious explanation for this. 
Only Els' report separated Eskom' s costs from those experienced by other 
distributors and found that Eskom would bear approximately 7596 of capital 
costs, cross-subsidies and financing requirements. Els concluded that although 
this appeared achievable for Eskom, there were doubts concerning the ability of 
non-Eskom distributors to raise both the necessary finance and cross-subsidies. 
3. Methodology 
The methodology used in this study is a financial analysis of electrification, from 
the viewpoint of the electricity distributors under consideration. This approach 
requires the quantification of capital expenditures, refurbishment costs, operating 
and support costs, revenues and finance charges. 
The measurement parameters selected for comparison were (1) the capital 
requirements; (2) the net present value; (3) accumulated debt; and (4) the required 
subsidies. 
3.1 Capital requirements 
Capital requirements were obtained from a modelling exercise undertaken for this 
study by Eskom Distribution Technologies. Demographic information contained 
in the National Electrification Forum (NELF) database was combined with 
information describing the current status of the distribution network in the 
country. Capital requirements included distribution and reticulation lines, 
transformers and service connections. Since the costs of any investment in 
transmission equipment is included in the bulk supply cost, it is excluded as an 
explicit item in the calculation of capital requirements.3 The required distribution 
line and transformer capacity was calculated from projected demand growth and 
linked to existing capacity in the area. Projects were prioritised in order of least 
capital cost, and household formation was accounted for in the modelling 
exercise. Detailed assumptions are provided in appendix A. 
This modelling of capital requirements represents the introduction of a new 
aspect to financial modelling of electrification. Previous estimates of capital costs 
have been largely based on rough estimates of costs per connection, extrapolated 
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The distinction between transmission and distribution equipment is usually based 
on line voltages with 132kV and below being classified as distribution lines. 
Within Eskom, the Transmission Group owns a small proportion of 132kV lines. 
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I into the future. Although more detailed capex modelling represents a significant 
improvement on this, it is recognised that the accuracy of results will be affected 
by a number of factors, including the accuracy of existing demographic 
information, the reliability of demographic projections, technology and cost 
changes as well as changes to technical standards and connection policies. 
However, the results obtained are the best that can be achieved with existing 
information and, at the very least, indicate the implications of continuing with 
current practices, technologies and standards. 
3.2 Electrification planning procedures 
A number of assumptions about electrification planning are contained in the 
analysis. Firstly it should be noted that planning is target driven and that targets 
are based on the munber of household connections to be made. These targets are 
set for each province and must be met by a distributor within its area of supply. 
For simplicity, all non-Eskom distributors are treated as a single distnbutor. 
The prioritisation of projects is based on least capital-cost. Although this means 
that the cost per connection is likely to increase over time, there are cases where 
the establislunent of infrastructure in early years is expensive and allows lower-
cost connections to be made in subsequent years. The principle of least-cost first 
implies that urban areas receive priority. However, the principle is modified by 
two factors. Firstly, targets must be met within a distributor's area of supply, and 
since Eskom currently does not have access to many urban sites this means that 
many of their connections will be based in rural areas. Secondly, targets are 
provided for each province in an attempt to improve access rates evenly 
throughout the country. This means that more costly connections will be made in 
provinces such as the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu/Natal when cheaper 
connections could be made in some of the main metropolitan centres. 
These assumptions represent a simplification of the planning process. In reality a 
wide range of factors affect project prioritisation, not least of which is the progress 
of consultations with the affected communities. However, when adopting a time 
horizon of 15 to 20 years these additional factors are impossible to incorporate. 
3.3 Sales and consumption growth 
The estimation of sales growth is one of the key factors in developing a financial 
analysis. Although a number of urban townships have had electricity for decades, 
their consumption levels have not proved to be accurate indicators of electricity 
consumption in more recently electrified areas. Since the electrification 
progranune only started in earnest in 1992, consumption data only goes back for a 
few years. 
Prior to the electrification progranune, sales figures in some of the main urban 
townships indicated average consumption levels well in excess of 500 kWh per 
month (Berrisford 1990). Not only were consumption levels found to be high, but 
consumption growth was rapid. Berrisford reports that 'usage grows quickly 
once electricity becomes available, and within a year the household is using over 
half of its ultimate consumption'. Even in the low-income village of Bapong, 
Berrisford found monthly electricity consumption to be 400 kWh per customer 
nine months after electrification. 
Table 2 indicates the average sales levels in Eskom's electrification projects over 
the past four years. In most cases averages have been below 100 kWh/month -
much lower than early predictions. The situation has been complicated by the 
high level of non-technical losses due to theft and meter failures. At present non-
technical losses are estimated, nationally, to be 34% of total consumption 
(Bezuidenhout 1995) which means that actual consumption levels have been in the 
order of 125 kWh/month. 
TABLE 2: Sales levels for Eskom' s electrification projects since 1992 
Average sales [kWh/month] 
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Region 1992 (Dec) 1993 1994 1995 
Free State 138 76 79 78 
Eastern, Northern & Western Cape 201 137 123 124 
KwaZulu/Natal 105 73 88 83 
Gauteng 53 70 67 83 
Northern, North West & Mpumalanga 32 51 55 59 
Total 96 75 80 83 
Sources: cskom 1992, cskom 1993, cskom 1994, Eskom 1995 
Nots: F~gures for 1992 are for December only, not averaged across th6 entire year. Since there is 
usually a December peak in sales, the 1992 figurBS may over BStimate the annual averagBS. 
An analysis of consumption growth rates in newly electrified settlements around 
the country has shown that growth has been in the region of 10-20% per year 
(Davis 1995). However, this has been off a very low base and growth is unlikely 
to be sustained at these high rates. 
The approach taken in this analysis has been to associate consumption with the 
type of technology selected by the customer and the type of locality (rural or 
urban). For 2.5A supplies the maximum monthly consumption was set at 100 
kWh. For 20A supplies the limit was set at 200 kWh (rural) and 250 kWh (uroan) 
and for 60A supplies the maximum consumption was 300 kWh (rural) and 350 
kWh (urban). Details on consumption growth are provided in appendix A. 
Naturally, as new customers are connected to the system each year, average 
consumption levels will be depressed. That is, growth rates of say 2096 per 
annum for an individual household will not translate to a 2096 average annual 
increase. This is because each year a large number of customers are connected 
who start off with very low consumption levels. The financial modelling has 
taken this effect into account. 
The focus of this analysis has been on household electrification. However, in any 
electrification project schools, clinics, shops and other businesses are routinely 
connected. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that electricity 
provides new opportunities for small businesses, particularly in urban areas 
(Thorn et al1995). The effect on electricity consumption and utility revenues as a 
result of non-domestic consumption is not made explicit but is implicit and 
conservatively estimated in the consumption growth used for households. 
Technical and revenue losses were used to convert sales figures to consumption. 
Table 3 presents the assumptions used. · 



















1994 1995 1996 
15% 15% 15% 
8% 8% 8% 
Revenue losses 
1997 1998 1999 
20% 15% 10% 







The time frame for the analysis was taken to be twenty years (1992 to 2011), and 
assets were depredated, in a straight line, over twenty years. It was assumed that 
distributors are ring-fenced from other activities, and any subsidies to 
electrification are dealt with explicitly. 
The real discount rate used is 696 and finance charges are based on a nominal 
interest rate of 16% (with inflation at 10%). 
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Electricity supply costs are based on bulk supply tariffs plus a small distnbution 
cost, rather than the lower marginal costs of supply. This cost equates to 
lOc/kWh in 1995 and is assumed to decrease in real terms in line with Eskom's 
price compact. 
Where conventional supply teclmology is used, the tariff is based on the existing 
Eskom Homelight tariff and is adjusted in line with Eskom's price compact. 
Where capacity differentiated supplies are introduced, the system of phased-in 
tariffs and connection fees proposed by Barnard (1995) has been used. Table 4 
presents these proposed tariff levels, together with the Homelight tariff. 
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TABLE 4: Domestic Tariffs [c/kWh] (in 1995 terms) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 on 
Home light' 25.8 24.8 23.0 22.8 22.6 22.4 
2.5A R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth 
20A 25.8 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4 
60A 25.8 24.4 25.3 26.2 27.1 28.0 
Used where capacity differentiated supplies are not introduced. 
Electrification targets were based on those proposed by Els (1994), brc»cen down 
for each province. Connections were assumed to be made evenly throughout each 
year, with an equal number of new customers being connected each month. Costs 
and revenues were calculated to reflect this gradual increase in customers. 
Capital costs were also assumed to be spread evenly throughout the year. 
All assumptions are presented in Appendix A. 
3.5 Key uncertainties 
Any analysis of this nature requires the projection into the future of a number of 
critical variables, thus embedding a level of uncertainty. The key WlCertainties 
relate to: 
Capital costs: this has been addressed through modelling as descnbed above. 
However, there remains a level of uncertainty associated with the results 
obtained. 
Sales growth: this is a function of consumption growth and the level of revenue 
losses. Experience over the past few years indicates that initial expectations of 
consumption growth were unrealistically high. High levels of revenue loss, 
largely through theft, have compounded the problem. However, basing 
consumption growth for a twenty year period on only a few years experience is 
difficult. 
Where practical, the analysis has included a sensitivity analysis on these key 
variables, and the discount rate, to indicate the effects on the results of any 
variation in the assumptions made. 
3.6 Institutional options 
The analysis was conducted for a variety of institutional arrangements. These are 
described in more detail below. 
Continuation of existing arrangements - tlte status quo scenario 
In this case supply rights are divided between Eskom and local authorities, largely 
based on the status quo, with the exception that all metropolitan areas are the 
responsibility of the respective metropolitan authorities. The analysis is 
conducted for Eskom, and non-Eskom distributors. Although combining all non-
Eskom suppliers under one heading clearly simplifies a complex situation, it does 
indicate the over-all effects of continuing with existing arrangements. 
In Eskom' s case, only the Distnbution Group is included in the analysis and 
unless otherwise stated, the term Eskom refers to this part of Eskom's business. 
Naturally there are difficulties in separating overhead costs between distnbution 
and generation/transmission. However, Eskom's calculation of unit support 
costs includes a pro-rata portion of most overheads. 
In this scenario connection targets must be achieved within an institutions' 
respective area of supply. This has implications for Eskom which does not have 
access to many urban areas. 
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It is assumed that Eskom introduces capacity differentiated supplies and local 
authorities continue to provide 40A connections. 
17te introduction of a national electricity distributor- the NED scenario 
Here the distribution industry is rationalised into one national agency responsible 
for all areas of the country. 
In this scenario, two cases are examined: (1) where the utility introduces the use of 
capacity differentiated supplies, with associated tariffs; and (2) where the practice 
of providing 40A supplies is continued. For the case where capadty differentiated 
supplies are introduced, the options of reducing current RDP connection targets 
by 2096, and the introduction of a R4 000 per connection capex limit, are also 
examined. 
The introduction of regional electricity distributors - tlte RED scenario 
The option of breaking distribution into regional utilities is examined. As a first 
building block, regions are based on provincial boundaries. Results for provincial 
distributors can then be combined should an investigation into larger distributors 
be required. 
The option of a national fund and differential bulk supply tariffs to manage 








FIGURE 1: Cases examined in the analysis 
4. Connection rates and access levels 
Non-Eskom 
distributors 
Figure 2 illustrates the connection rates and the resulting level of access to 
electricity. It can be seen that the percentage of households with access to 
electricity climbs steadily to around 7096 around the tum of the century. 
Thereafter, connection rates only slightly exceed the assumed household 
formation rate and the level of access by 2010 is 7696. 
The connection targets used have the effect of ensuring that all provinces have 
access levels of 7096 or more by 2012. This set of targets, based on what might be 
termed a 'geographical equity' prindple, clearly has a cost penalty attached. The 
alternative would be to prioritise projects on the basis of least cost, regardless of 
location. This approach would mean that urban areas, particularly the main 
metropolitan centres, would receive priority and as a result capital requirements 
in the earlier years would be reduced. Provinces with large rural populations 
would only be electrified later in the programme. This would inevitably lead to 
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different levels of access in different provinces. Although the analysis has not 
been able to accurately quantify the effects of this alternative strategy, rough 
calculations indicate that in the first five years (1995 to 1999) electrification would 
concentrate in Gauteng, Western Cape and Northern Cape, saving 18% of capital 
requirements during this early period (approximately Rl.7 billion). Expenditure 
in later years would increase as more costly areas in the Eastern Cape, Northern 
Province and I<waZulu/Natal were electrified. 
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The first observable effect of rationalising the distribution industry (the NED or 
RED scenario) is the shift in the spatial distribution of electrification. The 
modelling assumed that there were fixed electrification targets for each province, 
over a twenty year time horizon. Within each province, electrification projects 
were selected on the basis of least cost, constrained by the institution's rights of 
supply. Where Eskom does not have access to many urban localities, it is forced 
to achieve its targets in more remote, rural areas. In the case of a national 
distributor being established, this entity has supply rights to the entire country 
and so there is a tendency to concentrate on urban areas in the first few years of 
the programme, and leave rural areas to later in the programme. This effect is 
illustrated in figure 3. 
Secondly, the capex modelling revealed that it would be difficult for non-Eskom 
distributors to reach the targets assigned to them, simply because electrification 
levels in many urban centres would reach 100% before the end of the programme 
and electrification in these areas subsequently deals only with new household 
formation. Exceptions are in Gauteng, Western Cape and I<waZulu/Natal where 
urban distributors are able to meet their targets. A more careful distribution of 
provincial targets would help address this problem, but would not completely 
solve it. 
For the purposes of the financial modelling, it was assumed that non-Eskom 
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FIGURE 3: Percentage connections in rural (low density) areas 





5. Capital requirements for electrification 
Capital expenditure requirements were modelling using the computer tool 
developed by Eskom Distribution Technologies and the results are reported here. 
Both the average costs per connection and the total capital requirements are 
presented. 
5.1 Average costs per connection 
Figure 4 presents the estimates of average capital costs for three different 
institutions: Eskom, non-Eskom' and a national distributor. Although costs are 
below RS 000 for the first few years, as higher cost areas are reached average costs 
increase considerably. This increase is particularly marked for Eskom and the 
national distributor as these agencies are responsible for more remote rural areas. 
It should be noted that average costs are high - much higher than estimated by Els 
(1994) or van Horen (1994), and well in excess of current proposals for capital 
expenditure limits - R2 000 per connection in urban areas and R3 000 in rural areas 
(Barnard 1995). 
The results presented in figure 4 indicate that the containment of capital costs will 
likely prove to be the largest challenge facing distribution agencies. Given the 
current pressures to reduce capital requirements, it is extremely unlikely that 
Eskom, or any other distribution utility, would continue with electrification at 
these high costs. 
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There is an apparent anomaly as costs for non-Eskom distributors are relatively 
high in the first few years. This can be attributed to the need to establish 
distnbution networks in many areas, which can then be used to connect other 
households in subsequent years. 
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FIGURE 4: Capital costs per connection for different institutional options- 1995 to 2011 
The effect of capadty differentiated supplies 
Figure 5 presents the effect of utilising capacity differentiated supplies in rural 
areas. Since the 2.5A technology is only expected to be used in low density rural 
localities, costs are compared only for these areas. It can be seen that considerable 
capital savings are to be made through the use of this supply option. These 
figures are based on an assumption that 6096 of households in these areas opt for 
the 2.5A supply and 4096 choose a 20A supply. It should be noted that the costs 
do not reflect the possibility of large numbers of capacity upgrades in the future. 
Should these be necessary, the cost saving will be reduced. 
Overall, capex savings are substantial, particularly later in the electrification 
programme as more remote areas are reached. For the next five years, the savings 
per rural connection are in the order of 20-3096. In subsequent years, savings 
increase to ~96. 
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FIGURE 5: capital costs per connection in rural areas comparing the use of capacity 
differentiated supplies with standard 40A supplies 
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Average costs for different provinces 
Costs vary considerably for different provinces. Table 5 presents the average 
capital costs for the nine provinces. It can be seen that costs in the provinces with 
the highest rural populations are higher, and that the savings from using capacity 
differentiated supplies are correspondingly greater. 
TABLE 5: Average costs per connection [1995 R] for the different provinces-
figures are a weighted average for 1995 - 2011 
Province %using Using Using 40A Saving 
2.5A supply 2.5/20/SOA 
Eastern Cape 40% R 8100 R 14 300 44% 
Northern Province 30% R 5900 R 8 600 32% 
North-West 26% R 5700 R 8000 28% 
KwaZulu/Natal' 10% R 5000 R 6200 20% 
Northern Cape 28% R4800 R 6100 20% 
Western Cape 16% R 4300 R 5400 21% 
Mpumalanga 30% R 4100 R 5200 22% 
Free State 31% R 3900 R 5500 29% 
Gauteng 0% R 2800 R 3400 16% 
Total 20% R4900 R 7000 31% 
The proportion of households opting for a 2.5A supply is calculated as 60% of 1he low density Of 
'rural' areas. In KwaZulu/Natal, population density in much of the province is high and so this has 
had the effect of reducing the number of 2.5A connections. 
17te effect of reducing connection targets by 20% 
A 20% reduction in annual targets in each province means that there will be one 
million fewer connections over the period 1995 - 2011. During the first five years 
(1995 to 1999), this target reduction means that 440 000 fewer households will be 
connected. The effect of this reduced electrification rate is to achieve a 60% level 
of access by 2000, compared with 66% using the original set of targets. 
TABLE 6: The effect of reducing electrification targets by 20% 
Number of connections Levelofaccess 
1995-1999 1995-2011 2000 2011 
Using full targets 2 200000 5 000000 66% 67% 
Using 20% lower targets 1 760 000 4 000 000 60% 76% 
Difference 440 000 1 000 000 6% 9% 
Reducing targets has two effects on capital costs: firstly fewer connections are 
made, and secondly higher cost connections are postponed to later in the 
programme, thereby reducing average costs per connection. This second effect is 
shown in figure 6. The effect of lowering targets by 20% reduces the average cost 
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using capacity differentiated supplies, presented for two sets of connection targets 
5.2 Annual capital requirements 
Figure 7 presents the annual capital investments made by different institutions. 
Where capacity differentiated supplies are used, the total annual investment (for 
all distributors) peaks at R2.2 billion, declining to around Rl billion as the 
programme develops. The savings from using capacity differentiated supplies are 
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FIGURE 7: Annual capital requirements for the electrification programme' 
The RED scenario is not shown since, in the modelling exercise performed here, 
the national sum of REDs capital costs equals the NED scenario. 
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Table 7 shows the capital required for the next 17 years of the electrification 
programme. If capacity differentiated supply options are used, the total capital 
required is in the order of R26 billion - comparable with that estimated by Els 
(1994) and van Horen (1994). However, if current supply options continue to be 
used, capital costs will be significantly higher - in the order of R37 billion. The 
overall capital saving by using capacity differentiated supplies is in the order of 
R10.9 billion, equivalent to a 3096 saving. It should be noted that this modelling 
exercise represents the first .attempt to quantify the savings of using capacity 
differentiated supplies on a national basis. Although there may be errors 
associated with the costing estimates of these technologies, the order of 
magnitude of the result (an average saving of R600 million per annum) indicates 
that the potential savings are large. 
The modelling found that capital savings from the use of capacity differentiated 
supplies would be moderate up to the year 2000. Thereafter savings increase 
substantially as the electrification programme moves into more remote and 
inaccessible areas. Up until the year 2000, the savings on a national basis are in 
the order of R 2.3 billion - approximately 1596 of required capex. In the following 
11 years, savings are R8.6 billion - around 4096 of required capex. 
Much of the electrification programme has been premised on achieving capital 
costs below R 4 000 per connection. The results of the capital cost modelling 
exercise suggest that this is highly unlikely if current practices are continued. 
Utilising capacity differentiated supplies may help make this target realisable. 
TABLE 7: Capital costs (1995 R million) for NED and status quo: 1995-2011 
1995-2000 2001-2011 1995-2011 
NED- using 2.5/20/GOA R 11 100 R 15 600 R 26700 
NED- using 40A R 13 400 R 23 900 R 37 300 
Eskom - using 2.5/20/GOA R 7200 R 10 900 R 18 100 
Non-Eskom - using 40A R 3700 R 4300 R 8000 
Table 8 shows the total capital requirement for different regions. It can be seen 
that the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal and the Northern Province together 
account for over half of all capital requirements. It will be seen later in the 
analysis that these three provinces also have the poorest financial results and 
require the most subsidisation. 
TABLE 8: Total capital costs (1995 R million) for REDs: 1995-2011 
%of total 1995-2000 2001-2011 1995-2011 
Eastern Cape 25% R 2100 R4500 R 6600 
KwaZulu/Natal 20% R 1800 R 3600 R 5400 
Northern 14% R 1 500 R 2200 R 3700 
Gauteng 10% R 1600 R 1 300 R 2900 
North West 9% R 1000 R 1400 R2400 
Western Cape 8% R 1100 R 1 100 R 2200 
Free State 6% R 900 R600 R 1500 
Mpumalanga 6% RSOO R700 R 1 500 
Northern Cape 2% R 300 R200 RSOO 
Total 100% R11100 R 15 600 R 26 700 
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5.3 Summary 
The capital cost modelling exercise has revealed the following results: 
• Average costs per connection are likely to be higher than assumed in other 
analyses and higher than the proposed capital limits. 
• There are large regional differences: the provinces with large rural 
populations require the largest capital investment. In particular, the Eastern 
Cape has exceptionally high average costs of connection and will require 25% 
of all investment 
• The use of capacity differentiated tariffs in rural areas reduces the capital 
costs by some 30%, and these savings are particularly pronounced later in the 
programme as more remote settlements are reached. 
• Reducing electrification targets will reduce capital costs by slightly more than 
the percentage reduction in connections. This is due to the postponing of 
more expensive connections. 
• Total capital requirements are in the region of Rl.S to R2 billion per annum, 
resulting in a total capital investment of R26.7 billion over the next seventeen 
years (using capacity differentiated supplies). This is equivalent to a cost per 
connection of R4 900. 
6. The net present value of the programme 
The net present value (NPV) is calculated as the discounted net income stream, 
which includes all capital expenditure, operating costs and revenues. Finance 
charges are excluded since the nominal discount rate, at 16%, incorporates the 
cost of capital. 
Capital expenditure is taken over a twenty year period from 1992 to 2011. For 
each year in this period, a set of new customers are connected. For each set of 
new customers, future operating costs and revenues are projected for 20 years 
into the future. Thus, the NPV incorporates all capital expenditure and all 
revenue and cost streams associated with that expenditure, even for customers 
connected during the last few years of the programme. 
6.1 NPVs for different instiMions 
The net present value of the programme is negative, and this result is not affected 
by a sensitivity analysis of the key uncertain variables. 
TABLE 9: Summary of results comparing status quo with NED scenario: 1992-2011 







Connections 4mill 2.1 mill 6.1 mill 6.1 mill 
Ave connections per annum ! 200 000 110 000 310 000 310 000 
----···------····---: -·····----·- --···-:-···--··--------
Capax ! R 19 bill R 9 bill ! R 28 bill R 28 bill 
Ave capax per annum I R 930 mill R 420 mill I R 1350 mill R 1 350 mill 
Capax per connection l R 4 715 R 4 290 l R 4 570 R 4 680 
. ··- - - --->- --------
Net Present Value (NPV) (R 14 bill) (R 6 bill) 1 (R 20 biiO (R 20 bill) 
NPV per connection (R 3 450) (R 2 600) ~ (R 3 250) (R 3 250) 
Note: The capital requirament here is slightly greater than that reported in table 7 because this result 
Includes investments during 1992-1994. Similarly, the cost per connection is lower than reported 
in table 5 due to the effect of lower cost connections during 1992-1994. 
If the required rates of connection can be met, the financial analysis reveals that in 
terms of capital expenditure and NPV, there is little to distinguish the different 
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institutional arrangements. The NPV for the entire programme is approximately 
negative R20 billion, equivalent to negative R 3 2.50 per connection. It should be 
noted that the NPV per connection for non-Eskom distributors is significantly 
greater than that for Eskom, and this can be attributed to the higher proportion of 
rural consumers serviced by Eskom. These results are presented in table 9. 
6.2 NPVs for urban and rural electrification 
Nationally, the NPV per rural customer is approximately twice as negative as for 
urban customers. In rural, low density areas, the NPV per customer was found to 
be negative RS 000. In urlJan areas it was found to be negative R 2 600. 
6.3 The effect of capacity differentiated supplies 
The drive behind the initiative to introduce capacity differentiated supplies is to 
reduce capital costs. Since there is little experience with the widescale use of this 
technology, it is difficult to ascertain the effect on operating costs, particularly 
support costs and expenses incurred in upgrading from low capacity to higher 
capacity supplies. For the purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that support 
costs for load limited supplies would be the same as those for standard supplies, 
and that consumption would be lower. 
Table 10 shows the results of introducing these capital cost savings into the 
financial modelling, taking account of changes in sales levels and revenues (using 
the proposed tariff system). As can be seen, the reduction in capex leads directly 
to an increase in NPV. 
TABLE 10: The effects of using capacity limited supplies 
Total capex (1995- 2011) 
Capex per connection (1995- 2011) 
Net present value (1992-2011) 
Using 
40A supplies 
R 39 bill 
R 7000 











If the results using capacity differentiated supplies are compared with Els (1994), 
van Horen (1994) and NEES (1993), it can be seen that they are broadly in 
agreement. However, it should be noted that the capex modelling undertaken in 
this study shows that capital costs will only be kept within the range calculated by 
previous studies if capacity differentiated supplies are utilised. This study has 
found that if electrification continues to supply connections at this capacity, the 
NPV will be negative R29 billion - a 31% difference. 
6.4 The effect of introducing a capital cost per connection limit 
In many localities the capital costs of electrification appear to exceed R4 000 per 
connection, even if capacity limited supplies are used. 1bis section examines the 
effects of introducing the criterion that any costs in excess of R4 000 per 
connection (at the magisterial district level) must be provided by non-utility 
sources. 
Imposing this criterion will require that R9 billion from outside utilities must be 
made available over a seventeen year period (1995 to 2011). Although the amount 
required will vary from year to year, the average required amount is R580 million 
per year, and the maximum requirement in any one year is R850 million. 
The effects of introducing capital limits are presented in table 11. An alternative 
approach would be to estimate the number of connections which could be made 
within this limit. However, the modelling approach used here has not allowed 
this quantity to be estimated. 
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TABLE 11: The effects of enforcing capax limits of R4 000 per connection 
(on a national distributor using capacity differentiated supplies) 
With R4000 capex 
limit 
Total capax (1992- 2011) R28 bill 
External funding R 9 bill 
Distributor capax R19 bill 
Capax per connection R 3200 
Net present value (R15.6 bill) 
NPV per connection R 2550 
6.5 The effect of lower targets 
Without R4000 
capex limit 
R 28 bill 
none 
R 28 bill 
R 4 700 








Table 12 summarises the financial impacts of reducing electrification targets by 
2096. Since capex costs per connection are also reduced in this scenario, and there 
is greater concentration in urban areas, the effect is to reduce the NPV by 2896. 
However, the NPV per connection would be increased by only 996 . 
TABLE 12: The effects of reducing electrification targets by 20% 
(on a national distributor using capacity differentiated supplies) 
ROP targets ROP targets Percentage 
less 20% change 
Connections 4.9mill 6.1 mill 20% 
Net present value (R 14.4 bill) (R 20 bill) 28% 
Net present value per connection (R 2 900) (R 3 250) 9% 
6.6 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed, varying the discount rate, sales, losses and 
capital costs. The real discount rate was varied between 296 and 1096; losses were 
varied between 096 and 4096, and sales and capital costs were varied from 3096 
below to 3096 above the base figures. 
In all cases, the NPV remained negative, and the maximum NPV reached was 
(R12 biiiion); indicating that under all plausible circumstances, the NPV would 
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FIGURE 8: Sensitivity of NPV to sales, capital costs and losses 
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6.7 Summary 
The key results from the above discussion are summarised below. 
• In terms of NPV, there only negligible differences between a rationalised 
industry and the swtus quo. 
• The NPV of the electrification programme is negative (-R20 billion, using 
capacity differentiated supplies), and this result is not affected by a sensitivity 
analysis on the key variables. 
• The use of capacity differentiated tariffs increases the NPV of the programme 
by approximately 30%. 
• The introduction of a capital limit would mean that approximately R9 billion 
would have to be provided by non-utility sources, and this would increase the 
NPVby22%. 
• Lower targets (by 20%) have the effect of increasing the NPV by 2896 . Most of 
this is made up of reduced capital expenditure. 
7. Cash flow, debt and cross-subsidisation 
This section will look at operating losses and surpluses in the electrification 
programme and the effect of loan financing on accumulated debt This will be 
followed by an examination of existing surpluses in the distribution industry and 
an analysis of mechanisms to ensure that the electrification programme is 
financially viable. 
7.1 Operating loss/ surplus in electrification 
Operating losses/surpluses are calculated as the difference between all operating 
costs (bulk supply and support costs) and revenue from electricity sales and 
connection fees. Finance charges are excluded in this definition of losses. The 
effect of finance charges is included in the calculation of debt levels, presented in 
section 7.2. 
The analysis shows that for most of the time period under consideration, there are 
operational losses rather than surpluses. However, these are an order of 
magnitude lower than capital costs. The analysis reveals that the trend is for 
operating losses to decrease over time, as consumption increases. For the national 
distributor, losses are estimated to turn to surpluses towards the end of the 
programme. This is largely a result of the new pricing arrangements introduced 
in conjunction with the capacity differentiated supplies which imply real increases 
in tariffs (excepting the 2.5A supply) as opposed to real decreases as contained in 
Eskom' s pricing compact. The performance of the NED is better that that of the 
swtus quo due to the larger proportion of urban households electrified early on in 
the programme and the real tariff increases. If the model is run using real price 
decreases (in line with Eskom's price compact), the operating loss never turns into 
a surplus. These results suggest that real price increases are necessary to ensure 
the sustainability of operating electrification projects. 
The net operating income is strongly sensitive to the key assumptions. Relatively 
small changes in tariffs or sales levels affect the annual cash flow. 
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FIGURE 9: Operating losses for the electrification programme 
(excluding capital expenditure and finance charges) 
Within a national distributor, or between separate REDs, there are large 
differences in operating losses/surpluses. On a provincial basis, Gauteng makes 
the least loss per customer. All other provinces make substantial losses, as shown 
in table 13_ 
TABLE 13: Operating losses/surpluses for each province: 1992-2011 
Province Ave monthly Present value Portion 
surplus/(loss) per of surplus/(loss) of total loss 
customer 1995 R mill % 
Eastern Cape (R5.93) (R289) 27% 
Northern Province (R 6.28) (R177) 17% 
KwaZulu/Natal (R2.83) (R121) 12% 
Free State (R5.99) (R119) 12% 
Mpumalanga (R5.52) (R108) 11% 
North West (R4.70) (R98) 10% 
Western Cape (R3.86) (R78) 8% 
Northern Cape (R4.69) (R27) 2% 
Gauteng (R1.21) (R12) 1% 
Total (R4.01) (R1 029) 100% 
Note: H the time period 1996-2011 is taken, the losses decrease and, in the case of Gauteng, turns t> 
a surplus. This is because revenues improve later in the programme. 
7.2 loan financing and accumulated debt 
If the electrification programme is financed by debt, it is clear that a 'debt trap' 
will result. Operating surpluses, if they exist, are small and only prevalent 
towards the end of the programme. Debt will have to be used to cover capital 
costs, operating losses and interest payments (calculated at IS% per annum of 
accumulated debt)_ 
In tables 14 and 16 a debt to equity ratio figure is presented. This does not refer to 
the debt:equity for the distribution agency as a whole, but refers only to the 
electrification programme. Debt is calculated as the accumulation of capital 
expenditure, operating losses and finance charges on accumulated debt Equity is 
EDRC 20 
calculated as the current value of assets, that is, assets are depreciated in a straight 
line over 20 years and revalued to take account of inflation. The debt:equity is a 
useful indicator of the relative size of accumulated debt. 
TABLE 14: Accumulated debt, using 100% loan finance 
Accumulated debt [1995 R mill) Debt: Equity 
REDs 2000 2011 in 2011 
Eastern Cape A 3000 A 12 800 2.6 
KwaZulu/Natal A 3100 A 10 200 2.5 
Northern A 2500 A 8200 3.2 
North West A 1 600 A 4800 2.8 
Western Cape A 1700 A 4 700 3.3 
Mpumalanga A 1500 A 3700 3.8 
Free State A 1500 A 4000 4.5 
Northern Cape ASOO A 1 200 4.6 
Gauteng A600 A 6500 3.5 
NED scenario - using 2.5/20/GOA A 19 900 A 55000 2.3 
Eskom - using 2.5/20/GOA A 13 800 A 38 000 3.3 
Non-Eskom - using 40A A 6300 A 17000 3.0 
In practice neither Eskom nor other distributors use only loan finance - cross 
subsidies from other consumers are also used. Although this is dealt with in more 
detail below, tables 15 & 16 summarise the effect on debt for different levels of 
cross-subsidy (expressed in terms of Rands per electrification customer per 
month). As can be seen, to achieve a debt:equity ratio of one, the subsidy must be 
equivalent to R30 per customer per month. 
TABLE 15: Cumulative debt (1 995 A) for different levels of subsidy 
Cross subsidy Eskom Non- Eskom + NED 
(A/customer/month] Eskom Non-Eskom 
No cross-subsidy A 38 bill A 17 bill A 55 bill A 55 bill 
A10 A30 bill A 13 bill A 43 bill A43 bill 
A30 A 13 bill ASbill A 18 bill A 18 bill 
ASO A 0.2bill no debt A 0.2 bill no debt 
TABLE 16: Debtequity for different levels of subsidy 
Cross subsidy Eskom Non- Eskom + NED 
(A/customer/month] Eskom Non-Eskom 
No cross-subsidy 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.0 
A10 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.4 
A30 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.0 
ASO 0.02 n/a n/a n/a 
7.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Figure 10 shows the sensitivity of debt (assuming 10096 debt finance) to changes in 
capital costs, sales and losses. It can be seen that debt is particularly sensitive to 
changes in capital costs. This is because operating losses, influenced by sales and 
losses, are small in comparison with capital costs. The accumulation of debt is 
largely driven by capital costs of electrification. 
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FIGURE 10: Sensitivity analysis on accumulated debt in 2011 
(assuming 100% debt finance) 
7.4 Existing surpluses in the distribution industry 
40% 
It is well known that local authorities have, in the past, made substantial surpluses 
on the distribution of electricity. In general, these surpluses have been used to 
fund other service activities within each municipality. The most accurate and 
comprehensive data available on electricity distribution finances is available from 
the National Electricity Regulator (NER) . Table 17 summarises surpluses in the 
distribution industry for the 1992/3 financial year. 
In this financial year most distnbutors, including Eskom, had only small 
electrification programmes, and so the figures can be taken to be an estimate of 
surpluses outside of a potential electrification programme. In fact, given that 
there were some electrification losses in 1992/3, the actual surplus from non-
electrification distribution would be slightly higher than stated. However, it 
should be noted that the figures exclude certain distributors, particularly in the 
fonner homeland areas, and so may over represent the actual surpluses. 
The total surplus in the industry during 1992/3 was Rl.6 billion (in 1995 terms), 
equivalent to 1.2 cent/kWh sold. Of the total surplus, only 2496 was in Eskom 
distribution and more than half was accumulated in Gauteng. This is not only a 
consequence of the greater size of distribution in Gauteng, but also because 
distributors in Gauteng make a greater surplus per unit of electricity sold. 
Surpluses in Eskom are only O.Sc/kWh compared with 2.2c/kWh in non-Eskom 
distributors. 
It should also be noted that Eskom's bulk supply costs to its own distnbution 
business (used in project financial analyses) are approximately 2096 lower than 
those charged to municipal distributors. If transmission tariffs were equal, 
Eskom's surplus in distribution would decrease dramatically and may even tum 
into losses. In addition, it can be argued that Eskom's financial health is 
dependent on using annual profits to reduce its overall debt For both these 
reasons, the RED /NED scenarios have not included existing Eskom distribution 













TABLE 17: Sales and surpluses in the distribution industry· 1992/3 
(Source: Mountain 1995) 
Distribution [1000 MWh/year] Surplus [1995 R million/year] 
Eskom Non- Total Eskom Non- Total 
Eskom Eskom 
17 962 23384 41 346 200 722 922 
14 820 5630 20450 174 60.0 234 
8 860 10788 19 648 61 .2 112 173 
15 088 1 404 16 492 (36.7) 14.6 (22.1) 
3292 7786 11 078 (54.8) 199 144.2 
7 537 2098 9 635 (1.3) 43.8 42.5 
3467 852 4 319 37.2 (23.0) 14.2 
418 3 667 4085 11.4 57.0 68.4 
2404 549 2953 (13.7) 22.6 8.9 
73 871 56138 130 009 379 1 207 1 586 














Tables 15 & 16 indicate the effect of subsidies, measured in terms of a subsidy per 
household. However, it is more meaningful to measure subsidies as a levy on 
sales or as a proportion of operating surplus within the distribution industry. 
This analysis investigates the level of subsidy required to ensure that the 
accumulated debt in 2011 is not greater than the current value of depreciated 
assets. It is assumed that sales, and operating surpluses (for non-electrification 
activities), grow at a rate of 8% per annum - similar to average annual growth 
over the past 15 years.' 
Two useful ways of detennining the subsidy requirements to make electrification 
viable are: 
• to ensure that the NPV of the programme is zero or positive; and 
• to ensure that accumulated debt is less than or equal to the depreciated value 
of revalued electrification as~ts, i.e. an electrification debt:equity of less than 
one. 
The first criterion is stricter and implies greater subsidy requirements. Since any 
operating surpluses are small or non-existent in order to make the NPV non-
negative additional funds must cover all capital costs and operating losses. In this 
case there is no accumulated debt since all expenses are covered. Under the 
second criterion, debt is allowed to build up, but is contained within limits so that 
after twenty years the debt is no larger than the (revalued) book value of 
electrification assets. 
If the first criterion is used, the total subsidy requirement is exactly equal to the 
negative NPV of the programme, as presented in section five of this report The 
rest of this section will look at subsidy requirements to contain debt levels. 
Figure 11 presents the required level of subsidy to ensure the financial 
sustainability of the programme. Total subsidies peak at around Rl.S billion in 
1999 and thereafter vary between Rl billion and R1.2 billion for the rest of the 
programme. 
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FIGURE 11: Subsidies required by the electrification programme 
There are three possible ways to fund these required subsidies: 
• as a direct transfer from the Government fiscus; 
• as a cross-subsidy from surpluses within the distribution industry; and 
• from a price increase, either to all customers or only domestic customers. 
Figures 12 & 13 express the subsidy requirements as a percentage of operating 
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FIGURE 13: Subsidies as a general price increase 
Within Eskom Distribution, current surpluses are insufficient to cover operating 
losses. However, a general price increase of 0.54<:/kWh (equivalent to a 596 
increase) would ensure the financial viability of Eskom's electrification 
programme. 
It is possible to perform this analysis for non-Eskom distributors as a group, 
although there is limited value to the result as surpluses and deficits vary greatly 
between distributors_ However, if transfers could be effected between municipal 
distributors (and this would be largely from Gauteng to other areas), their 
electrification programmes would be viable if 1596 of surpluses could be captured. 
This would be equivalent to a 033clkWh general price increase, approximately 
396 of current price levels. However, the difficulties of utilising cross-subsidies 
with this institutional arrangement effectively rule out this subsidy mechanism_ 
Firstly, existing surpluses are largely used to cover other municipal requirements 
and using them for electrification may precipitate a crisis in local government 
financing. Although a price increase could raise sufficient funds, the practicality 
of co-ordinating transfers between three hundred or more distributors would 
make this option extremely difficult to implement 
Lastly, in the case of a national distributor, it is assumed that current surpluses in 
the industry can be extrapolated into the future, growing at 896 per annum. 
Under these circumstances, the programme would be viable if 4096 of surpluses 
could be captured, equivalent to a 039c/kWh general price increase (a 496 
increase). If these price increases were only applied to domestic customers, so 
that cross-subsidisation only occurs within the domestic sector, the price increase 
would be 2_6c/kWh, equal to a 1696 increase (given domestic tariffs of 16c!kWh). 
If the capital limit of R4000 per connection is enforced and the utilities' capital 
costs are reduced, then the required general tariff increase would be reduced by 
approximately 5096. 
TABLE 18: Subsidies required for electrification': 1996-2011 
as an annual as a% as a general as a domestic 
transfer of surplus price increase' price increase' 
[c/kWh], [(%)] [c/kWh], [%] 
Eskom R875mill 105% 0.54 (4%) n/a 
Non-Eskom R400mill 15% 0.33 (3%) n/a 
NED R1200mill 40% 0.39 (4%) 2-6 (16%) 
Averaged over the 16 year period. 
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2 Percentage price Increases are approximations for non-Eskom distributors. 
3 Assuming that 15% of all electricity sold is for domestic consumption . 
The size of the price increase necessary to sustain electrification is dependent on 
the annual growth in electricity consumption. The results presented in table 18 
are based on an annual growth rate of 8%. Over the past 15 years, average 
growth in electricity consumption has been of this magnitude. Figure 14 presents 
the sensitivity of the required price increase to growth in electricity consumption. 
It can be seen that for higher growth rates (corresponding to higher national 
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FIGURE 14: Sensitivity of required price increase 
to general electricity consumption growth 
7.6 Subsidies for REDs 
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In order for the electrification programmes in each province to be financially 
sustainable, it is necessary for a large proportion of capital expenses and operating 
losses to be paid for by grants or cross-subsidies. Figure 15 shows the subsidy 
requirements for each provincial region. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal and 
the Northern Province together account •tor some 55% of the total subsidy 
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FIGURE 15: Required subsidies for each province 
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As before there are three ways of providing the necessary funds: (1) as a direct 
grant from Government; (2) as a cross-subsidy from existing surpluses; or (3) as a 
price increase. If either of the last two methods are used, it is necessary to 
provide a mechanism to transfer funds between REDs. This can be done either 
through a fund, which redistributes surpluses among REDs; or through transfer 
pricing at the bulk tariff level. 
On average, the required subsidy is approximately 7096 of capital expenditure. If 
there were Government contributions towards electrification, they would have to 
amount to this high proportion of capital costs in order to make the programme 
financially viable for utilities. 
One mechanism to generate the required funds for electrification is to increase 
general tariffs, that is to tax electricity distribution. It was found that a general 
tariff increase of 0.39c/kWh was necessary to generate sufficient funds. Two 
ways to distribute these funds would be to establish an electrification fund, or to 
use transfer pricing at the bulk supply level. 
An electrification fund would receive money raised from a price increase that is 
not used for a RED's own electrification programme, and distribute it elsewhere. 
In effect this fund would mainly tax Gauteng and pay other provinces. Table 19 
shows the average annual payments to and from such a fund. 
The same transfers can be effected through a system of bulk tariff discounts and 
surcharges. The net effect on the bulk supplier would be zero, but some areas 
would receive cheaper electricity and others would pay more. This mechanism 
can be adapted to match the required transfers and table 19 presents the average 
surcharges and discounts for each province. 
TABLE 19: Annual funding using a general 0.39c/kWh price increase-
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The main findings of this component of the analysis can be summarised as 
follows: 
• The electrification progranune requires extensive subsidisation to be 
financially viable. 
• These subsidies are in the range of Rl billion to R1.2 billion per annum, 
equivalent to approximately 7096 of capital costs. 
• There are sufficient surpluses within the electricity distribution industry to 
provide these subsidies, if 4096 of surpluses are available for this purpose. 
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• It surpluses are not available, a general price increase of 0.39c/kWh (under a 
rationalised industry) would be required to ensure the financial sustainability 
of the programme. A smaller increase would be required under a scenario of 
higher economic growth. Alternatively, Government would have to 
contribute approximately 70% of capital costs. 
• Under REDs, financial transfers could be effected either through an 
electrification fund or a system of bulk supply discounts and surcharges. 
8. Conclusions 
This analysis has attempted to examine the financial effects of a number of factors 
which affect electrification, including the use of capacity differentiated supplies, 
decreasing electrification targets, and most importantly, restructuring the 
industry. The main conclusions are summarised below. 
The effects of using capacity differentiated supplies 
It was found that the capital savings associated with the use of capacity 
differentiated supplies were in the order of 30%. This led directly to a 30% 
improvement in the NPV of the programme. 
It should be noted that average costs per connection are likely to be significantly 
higher than assumed in previous analyses, especially later in the programme as 
more remote areas are included. The use of capacity differentiated supplies can 
go some way towards reducing supply costs, but there will still be a large number 
of settlements where the average cost of supply is well in excess of a R4 000 limit. 
If a capital cost per connection limit is introduced, either a large contnbution 
towards capital expenditure will be required (in the order of R9 billion over 20 
years) from Government or customers; or the electrification programme will have 
to be scaled down. The option of utilising off-grid power supplies, in particular 
photovoltaic systems, requires further investigation. 
The effect of decreasing electrification targets 
A scenario where electrification targets are decreased by 20% was investigated. 
This had the effect of reducing average costs per connection by approximately 8%, 
thereby bringing down the total capital requirements by more than the 2096 
reduction that might have been expected, and increasing the NPV of the 
programme by 28%. 
The effects of rationalising tlte distribution industry 
If connection targets can be achieved under all scenarios, the differences between 
institutional arrangements, measured in terms of NPV and capital requirements, 
are minimal. However, it should be stressed that the modelling showed that it 
would be extremely difficult for non-Eskom suppliers to meet their targets within 
their areas of supply. This is simply because electrification will approach 
saturation in some urban areas and electrification will be reduced to the rate of 
household formation. Under a rationalised industry, rights of access problems are 
resolved and it is possible to prioritise electrification areas appropriately. 
Under a rationalised industry the operating losses are smaller and tum to 
surpluses later in the programme, largely as a result of tariff increases, but also 
because a higher percentage of urban connections are made earlier in the 
programme. It should be noted that this result is sensitive to small changes in 
some of the base assumptions. 
It should be noted that operating losses are small compared to capital 
requirements and the financial results are largely driven by capital costs. Given 
this result, together with the conclusion that capital costs may be higher than 
previously anticipated, one of the major challenges fadng the distribution 
industry will be to reduce connection costs. 
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Given that operating losses are comparatively small, it is concluded that relatively 
small improvements in sales, losses, operating costs and possibly a tariff increase 
would make operating electrification a financially viable enterprise. 
Subsidies and cross-subsidies 
The subsidies required to keep debt within acceptable levels were quantified in 
this analysis. For a rationalised industry, subsidies would have to be in the order 
of R1 to R1.2 billion per year, approximately 70% of total capital requirements. 
These subsidies could come (1) from Government; (2) 40% of surpluses in the 
entire distribution industry; (3) a 0.39c/kWh levy on electricity sales throughout 
the country (a 4% increase); or (4) a 2.6c/kWh levy on domestic electricity 
consumption (a 16% increase). If REDs were in place, either a central fund or a 
system of bulk tariff discounts/surcharges could be used to redistribute the funds 
among the utilities. 
If a distribution utility (or utilities) is to be created, separate from Eskom's 
Generation and Transmission Groups, and if much of the existing surplus 
associated with electricity distribution continues to be earmarked for local 
governments, it is clear that such a utility will be in a precarious financial position. 
Under these circumstances, careful consideration will have to be given to the 
following: 
• mechanisms to raise sufficient capital at low cost, with the assurance that 
loans and finance charges will be met; 
• mechanisms to transfer subsidies (or utilise cross-subsidies) in order to ensure 
financial sustainability of distribution; 
• adequate regulation of bulk supply tariffs to ensure that the surpluses 
associated with electricity supply are equitably allocated between a generation 
and transmission utility on the one hand, and a distribution utility (or 
utilities) on the other. 
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Appendix A:. Ust of assumptions 
A. 1 Technology choice 
Where capacity differentiated supplies are offered, it is assumed that there are 


















The time horizon is twenty years, and assets are depreciated over this period to 
calculate the residual value of assets. 
A.3 Capital costs and refurbishment 
Capital costs are calculated from Distribution Technologies capex model. the 
assumptions used in the modelling are presented below. Costs are based on 1995 
quotes from contractors. 
Bulk sub-station transformer size 
Bulk HV line type 
Bulk MV line type 
MV /LV infrastructure % losses 
Bulk % losses 




88kV Panther as average 
22 kV Mink as average 
9% 
3.5% 
MV Maypole technology 
Optimised MV /LV 3-phase technology 
Service connection costs (excl. meter) 1-100 connections: R440 per connect. 
100- 500 connections: R 415 per connect 
> 500 connections: R 3% per connect 
Metering costs: ECU R 350 
Circuit breaker & earth leakage R 150 
ADMD: Rural: 1.06kVA 
Urban: 1.94kVA 
Refurbishment is calculated as 20% of original capital (inflated to current values) 
at year 10. 
A.4 Losses, load factor and support costs 
Losses are expressed as a percentage of total energy supplied. 
Technical losses 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 on 
Rural 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Urban 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Revenue losses 
'92-'95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 on 
Rural 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 10% 























A.S Tariffs and connection fees 
Tariffs [1995 R] 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Home light' 25.8 24.8 23.0 22.8 
2.5A R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth R14/mth 
20A 25.8 24.4 24.4 24.4 
60A 25.8 24.4 25.3 26.2 
Used where capacity differentiated supplies are not introduced. 
Connection fees [1995 R] 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Home light' R45 R45 R45 R45 
2.5A R45 R9 R9 R9 
20A R45 R45 R90 R135 
60A R45 R272 R363 R545 

























A.6 Price changes over time 
Price changes relative to Inflation 
Inflation Homelight tariff Ave bulk costs 
1992 10% -5% -5% 
1993 10% -2% -2% 
1994 10% -1% -1% 
1995 10% -5.5% -5.5% 
1996 10% -7% -7% 
1997 10% -1% -1% 
1998 10% -1% -1% 
1999 10% -1% -1% 
2000 10% 0% 0% 
2001 10% 0% 0% 
2002 10% 0% 0% 
2003 10% 0% 0% 
2004 10% 0% 0% 
2005 10% 0% 0% 
2006 10% 0% 0% 
2007 10% 0% 0% 
2008 10% 0% 0% 
2009 10% 0% 0% 
2010 10% 0% 0% 
2011 10% 0% 0% 
All other prices and costs (support costs, material costs) are assumed to remain 
constant in real tenns. 
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A.7 Consumption growth 
Each category of conswner is assigned a consumption growth profile. This, 
together with the connection rate and cumulative number of each type of 
connection, is used to calculate average consumption for each year. 
Consumption growth 
Rural Urban 
2.5A 20A 60A 2.5A 20A GOA 
Min 50 50 100 50 50 100 
Max 100 200 300 150 250 350 
1 50 50 100 50 50 100 
2 63 70 133 67 73 136 
3 76 89 166 83 95 173 
4 89 109 200 100 118 209 
5 100 129 233 116 141 246 
6 100 149 266 133 163 282 
7 199 168 299 150 186 318 
8 100 188 300 150 209 350 
9 100 200 300 150 231 350 
10 100 200 300 150 250 350 
11 100 200 300 150 250 350 
12 100 200 300 150 250 350 
13 100 200 300 150 250 350 
14 100 200 300 150 250 350 
15 100 200 300 150 250 350 
16 100 200 300 150 250 350 
17 100 200 300 150 250 350 
18 100 200 300 150 250 350 
19 100 200 300 150 250 350 
20 100 200 300 150 250 350 
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A.8 Connection rates 
Two national scenarios are used: one follows the RDP or NEES meditun-rate 
scenario, and the other is 2096 less than this. These totals are broken down into 
Eskom and non-Eskom (assuming existing rights of supply), and the combined 
total is used for the case of a single national distnbutor. The tables below only 
show the RDP scenario. 
Connection rates (RDP scenario)- National distributor 
ECape Mpum. KwaZul N-W NCape North F.S. G'teng WCape Total 
1992 12400 19600 70000 21400 5300 14 200 14200 28700 14200 200000 
1993 25100 26900 71800 26800 14300 32200 52000 ~600 23300 319000 
1994 35900 25100 70000 17900 14300 48500 34100 64700 39500 350000 
1995 61400 27200 75800 22000 11 000 65000 39800 68800 29000 400000 
1996 87600 33600 85800 35400 10200 39000 35400 91200 31800 450000 
1997 81000 32400 86400 36000 10800 39600 34200 93600 36000 450000 
1998 86600 32600 84800 41600 9200 43400 32600 86600 32600 450000 
1999 82400 32000 86000 41000 8600 46400 32000 86000 35600 450000 
2000 62500 24 700 71500 31900 6700 42700 24 700 57000 28300 350000 
2001 58700 24500 73000 31700 6500 42500 24500 58600 30000 350000 
2002 57100 24 700 73200 31900 4900 42700 24 700 58900 31900 350000 
2003 39400 17 800 53700 21400 3400 30300 16000 -43 000 25000 250000 
2004 39400 17 800 53700 21400 3400 30300 16000 43000 25000 250000 
2005 39400 17800 53700 21400 3400 30300 16000 43000 25000 250000 
2006 30300 14000 42700 17900 2600 25000 12500 35700 19300 200000 
2007 30300 14000 42700 17900 2600 25000 12500 35700 19300 200000 
2<n! 23000 14 000 42700 14000 3500 21200 14000 42800 24800 200000 
2000 23000 14000 42700 14000 3500 21200 14000 42800 24800 200000 
2010 23000 14000 42 700 14000 3500 21200 14000 42800 24800 200000 
2011 28700 17900 52000 17900 4400 25000 17900 53900 32300 250000 
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Connection rates (RDP scenario) - Non-Eskom only 
ECape Mpum. KwaZul N-W NCape North F.S. G'\eng WCape Total 
1992 5000 1 100 21700 2900 1600 3100 6800 1000 6800 50000 
1993 12200 6600 38100 6500 5100 6300 33500 1500 12200 122000 
1994 17400 4800 25200 5000 6900 4100 8200 18500 9900 100000 
1995 20700 5000 22600 3500 4600 5800 12100 17000 8700 100000 
1996 33900 18800 2200 9500 8400 3900 16900 35700 20700 150000 
1997 31000 17600 900 10100 9000 4 500 15700 38100 23100 150000 
1998 25500 14100 16000 8300 5500 900 12300 49600 17800 150000 
1999 23200 13500 15300 7700 4900 3900 11700 49000 20800 150000 
2000 18100 8100 21200 6000 3000 3900 6200 20000 13500 100000 
2001 18000 9700 7800 7700 2800 7400 7900 23500 15200 100000 
2002 20100 11800 37500 11 600 2200 11300 9900 27500 18100 150000 
2003 13500 10400 22000 6600 1600 8100 4900 19000 13900 100000 
2004 13500 10400 22000 6600 1600 8100 4900 19000 13900 100000 
2005 19100 10400 3300 8500 1600 10000 6800 24500 15800 100000 
2000 10000 6600 42300 5000 800 4 700 3300 17200 10100 100000 
2007 10000 4800 44100 5000 BOO 4 700 3300 17200 10100 100000 
2000 6400 4800 40500 2900 1700 900 2900 26200 13700 100000 
2009 6400 4800 40500 2900 1 700 900 2900 26200 13700 100000 
2010 6400 4800 40500 2900 1700 900 2900 26200 13700 100000 
2011 6400 4800 40500 2900 1700 900 2900 26200 13700 100000 
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Connection rates (RDP scenario) - Eskom only 
ECape Mpum. KwaZul N-W NCape North F.S. G'teng WCape Total 
1992 7400 18500 48300 18500 3700 11100 7400 27700 7400 150000 
1993 12900 20300 33700 20300 9200 25900 18500 48100 11100 200000 
1994 18500 20300 44800 12900 7400 44400 25900 .S200 29600 250000 
1995 40700 22200 53200 18500 6400 59200 27700 51800 20300 300000 
1996 53700 14800 83600 25900 1800 35100 18500 55500 11100 300000 
1997 50000 14800 85500 25900 1800 35100 18500 55500 12900 300000 
1998 61100 18500 68800 33300 3700 42500 20300 37000 14800 300000 
1999 59200 18500 70700 33300 3700 42500 20300 37000 14800 300000 
2000 44400 16600 50300 25900 3700 38800 18500 37000 14800 250000 
2001 40700 14800 65200 24000 3700 35100 16600 35100 14800 250000 
2002 37000 12900 35700 20300 2700 31400 14800 31400 13800 200000 
2003 25900 7400 31700 14800 1800 22200 11 100 24000 11100 150000 
2004 25900 7400 31700 14800 1800 22200 11100 24000 11100 150000 
2005 20300 7400 50400 12900 1800 20300 9200 18500 9200 150000 
2006 20300 7400 400 12900 1800 20300 9200 18500 9200 100000 
2007 20300 7400 400 12900 1800 20300 9200 18500 9200 100000 
2006 16600 9200 2200 11100 1800 20300 11 100 16600 11100 100000 
20CS 16600 9200 2200 11100 1800 20300 11100 16600 11100 100000 
2010 16600 9200 2200 11100 1800 20300 11 100 16600 11100 100000 
2011 21600 14200 7200 16100 6800 30300 16100 21600 16100 150000 
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Study sites for Case Study 8- 29 January 
The study will be earned out in two magisterial districts in the N E Cape: 
Mt Ayliff and Bizana. 
Conversation with Reinholdt Viljoen - IDT prowamme manager 
There are 7 clinics and 2 hospitals in Mt Ayliff. 
There are 16 clinics and 3 hospitals in Bizana (Mkambati, St.Patrick, 
Greenville). 
Of the clinics in the former Transkei which are to be electrified, about %0% will 
be grid and 50% non-grid. 
The assessment of the clinics in the area was originally done by Tescor and is 
somewhat outdated. 
IDT will be carrying out some grid-extensions to clinics - falling outside of the 
5-year Eskom plans. 
The process has been that IDT prepares a plan for the provincial Department of 
Health - the provincial Department of Health will make some changes to the plan 
based on their priorities. The D of Health is the final arbitrator. 
Conversation with Godfrey Sibancia - field manager for DL V 
Dries Louw is the manager of the overall project at DL V (linked me with 
Sibanda) 
He suggested the following study: 
Mnceba - Mzalwaneni (~rid) 
Eskom will probably be electrifying this area in mid-1996. 
It includes three villages: Mnceba, Ndantaka and Mvenyane. 
The clinic is called Mnceba clinic. 
There is a junior school and a secondary school in the area. There is also a 
mission with a resident priest. 
Mzalwaneni is located past Kokstad take the road to Mt Ayliff and then take the 
tum off to Tabankulu. Drive for 5-7krn and then take the Mnceba tum off. 
The Mt Frere settlement area will be a problem because it is serviced by the Mt 
Frere hospital - too urban. 
Another possibility is Sipetu- but this will only be electrified in 1997. 
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